“If it’s not broken, don’t fix it?” An inquiry concerning the understanding of child-robot interaction. by Jones, Raya Abigail
  
“If it’s not broken, don’t fix it?” An inquiry 
concerning the understanding of child-
robot interaction 
Raya A. Jones1 
Cardiff University, UK 
 
Abstract. Ethical standpoints regarding robots for children are polarized, yet there 
is insufficient evidence to substantiate either position. This is compounded by the 
multiplicity of lenses through which child-robot interactions are investigated. This 
paper explores implications for translating knowledge from robotics to 
developmental psychology. The concept of a ‘care-receiving robot’ is a case in point, 
favorably reviewed here though the manner of its testing discloses the need for a 
conceptual framework that takes into robotics, processes of child development, 
sociocultural expectancies about optimal development, and factors affecting 
research priorities. 
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1. Introduction 
The technology has advanced since Robots for Kids [1] was published in 2000, the book’s 
descriptive content might be dated, but the normative remains constant: robots are 
designed, marketed and evaluated for what they can do for us. The present inquiry looks 
askance at that narrative. How can we tell whether robots are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for us?  
The tension between the descriptive and normative is particularly acute in the case 
of robots for young children. Ethical standpoints are polarized between technological 
utopianism and dystopian forebodings: beliefs in likely benefits ‘push’ for the 
technology, fears of psychological damage to children ‘pull’ in the other direction; and 
yet there is insufficient empirical evidence for substantiating either position. There is a 
‘catch 22’ situation: psychologists cannot describe the actual impact on child 
development until the technology becomes ubiquitous enough to have an impact.  
The situation is further compounded by the multiplicity of lenses through which 
phenomena of child-robot interaction (CRI) can be investigated, as the following aims 
to demonstrate. Following a statement of the problem and the inquiry’s focus, this paper 
draws upon available research to explore implications for translating empirical 
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knowledge from robotics to developmental psychology, and tentatively proposes a 
conceptual framework for understanding CRI phenomena. 
2. The Problem in Focus 
Social issues are increasingly recognized among the problems defining the engineering 
field of human-robot interaction (HRI). Whereas sociologists typically seek to describe 
the impact of technology on society and persons, engineers usually want to know how to 
design robots that will be desirable for society and persons. Wright Mills defined the 
sociological imagination as a stance that construes social phenomena in terms of what 
these reveal about the workings of a society [2]. The technological imagination transpires 
as a stance predisposed towards construing social issues in terms of their implications 
for technology [3]. There is also a psychological imagination, a stance inclined to 
interpret social phenomena and to utilize robotics in terms of what these may reveal about 
mind and behavior at individual and group levels. The psychological imagination is 
further fragmented into what cognitive, developmental, social and clinical psychologists 
typically want to know.  
2.1. What Are We Looking at?  
Latour has demonstrated how objects of scientific study, which are taken to be objective 
elements of the natural world (atoms, microbes, molecules, neutron stars etc.), come into 
our ken in laboratory procedures, various instruments, methods of archiving, and 
mathematical formulations [4]. A similar caveat applies to CRI as an object of study. 
Since few children have opportunities to meet robots in everyday life, the phenomenon 
of interest is often created for the purpose of investigating it.  
Investigators construct CRI phenomena not only by bringing robots to children (or 
children to robots) but also by manipulating the independent variables; so much so that 
it could be queried whether we are looking at the same phenomenon across studies. 
Available studies differ in terms of robots’ characteristics (e.g. physical appearance), 
modality (real robots versus pictures or videos) and duration (from brief laboratory 
exposures to long-term relationships with privately owned robot pets). On the ‘child’ 
side, available studies can be sorted most conspicuously according to (a) age group and 
(b) presence/absence of autism. Other demographic and individual factors (e.g. gender, 
culture/nationality, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, personality, intelligence) 
could conceivably be associated with particular patterns of CRI. Inquiries about those 
are seldom raised apropos children, perhaps because studies are concerned either with 
robot design—hence seeking ‘universals’ of the child-as-user—or with child 
development, hence seeking psychological universals. 
Scientific problems sometime intersect across robotics and developmental 
psychology in ways that create the impression of a common ground. For instance, 
psychologists investigating the development of children’s reasoning about living/non-
living entities sometime use pictures and videos of robots [5, 6], methods that cannot 
predict children’s interaction with real robots. There is robust evidence that by age 4 
most children make clear distinctions between prototypical living and non-living kinds, 
and tend to designate robots to the inanimate group. Yet research documenting children’s 
attributions of aliveness to robot pets with which they actually interact suggests the 
  
emergence of a new ontological category that disrupts current animate/inanimate 
distinctions [7-9].  
Researchers’ own ontological positions also influence what is looked at (and how). 
Some cognitive scientists deploy robot simulations towards knowledge of learning 
mechanisms in infancy, such as imitation (see contributions in [10]). Reciprocally, 
developmental robotics utilizes knowledge informed by Vygotskian theory about how 
children learn towards designing for machine learning [11]. The belief that children and 
robots are interchangeable in terms of learning mechanisms conceptualizes the generic 
child from the mechanistic standpoint that is eschewed by the Vygotsky-inspired 
sociocultural movement in developmental psychology. The core metatheory of the 
respective research programs ‘spins’ likely constructions of CRI phenomena in ways that 
protect incommensurable ontologies. 
 Consequently, there are pragmatic challenges of translating empirical knowledge 
obtained in one context into useful data in another context. The case presented in Section 
3 illustrates the limitations of mapping roboticists’ findings onto the interests of 
developmental psychology.  
2.2. Present Focus 
The first five years of life involve momentous achievements across all domains of human 
development. This age group corresponds to the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) 
of the national curriculum in Britain. By age 5 children should be able to count from 1 
to 20, use everyday language to describe size, weight, capacity, position, etc., and so 
forth. Some of these skills can be practiced with interactive devices. There are already 
many toys that incorporate early learning features. Robotic toys could be an upgrade. A 
more controversial issue is whether robots could enhance EYFS skills listed under 
personal, social and emotional development: self-confidence and self-awareness; 
managing feelings and behavior; and making relationships.  
There is robust evidence in support of robot interventions for promoting social skills 
among school-aged autistic children [12]. Their efficacy could be due to the symptomatic 
social impairments attributed to the so-called ‘broken mirror’ (referring to the mirror 
neurons system, which facilitates imitation and empathy). Whereas autistic children 
respond better to robots than to people, non-autistic infants are innately attuned to human 
beings, are likely to follow an adult’s gaze more readily than a robot’s [13] and by middle 
childhood, prefer peers to robot playmates [14]. Providing robot companions to 
typically-developing children might be driven by a naïve expectation that the young child 
will practice social skills with the robot. Yet these interactions might alter the child’s 
social-moral attunement to the world. Research with children who had robot pets 
indicates lowered empathy with living animals [15]. 
Hence, if it’s not broken, don’t fix it. A question mark follows the maxim in the title 
so as to avoid preemptive rejections of the technology. We simply don’t know yet. The 
only claim that can be made with confidence is that providing for the EYFS is not an 
engineering matter of harnessing knowledge about how young children naturally develop 
and then building machines to ‘fix’ or enhance what comes naturally. The application of 
robotics in this age group raises ethical and scientific issues deserving a comprehensive 
treatment beyond this paper’s scope. The site of tensions is sampled here with attention 
to a lack of calibration across epistemologies.  
  
3. The Care-Receiving Robot (CRR) 
The concept of a CRR was developed by Tanaka and associates [16-20]. Although they 
present it as a kind of robot, ‘care-receiving’ is an emergent property of the interaction 
event, reflecting caretaking behavior that some children sometime spontaneously apply 
to small humanoids such as QRIO (Sony) and NAO (Aldebaran Robotics). CRR trials 
demonstrate how opportunities to interact with robots can elicit the kind of prosocial 
attitudes that caregivers and educators seek to promote. 
3.1. Background 
Tanaka’s idea grew out of a longitudinal study, the RUBI project, that placed robots in 
an American university’s crèche for several months [21]. Having observed how toddlers 
aged between 1½ and 2 years interacted with QRIO (e.g. showing concern when it fell 
down; putting a blanket over it when it was turned off), Tanaka reasoned that the robot’s 
size—smaller than a toddler—induced them to take care of it [16, 17].  
Later in Japan, NAO was placed for three days in an English learning class for 3- to 
6-year-olds, attended by 2-5 children per session. It was teleoperated to participate as a 
learner in vocabulary-learning games [18, 19]. An increase of caretaking instances 
correlated with the robot’s behavior: on Day 1 it answered all the questions correctly 
whereas on Day 3 it answered everything incorrectly. The children spontaneously took 
it upon themselves to teach the robot. Interestingly, the average of correct answers was 
higher when the children were tested 3-5 weeks later than it was in a post-test on the 
same day as the experiment. Parents reported that their children had enjoyed the 
experience so much they continued to play the game at home for days afterwards, which 
meant rehearsing the vocabulary. 
Subsequently NAO was placed in a private school of English in Japan [20]. Children 
aged between 4 and 8 drew shapes along with NAO in a game designed to enhance their 
English vocabulary. An experimental condition in which the robot was incapable of 
learning was associated with the smallest gains in the child’s learning. There was no 
significant difference in learning across experimental conditions in which the robot either 
answered everything correctly or was capable of learning.  
3.2. Evaluation 
The tangible evidence for learning outcomes is encouraging, albeit based on very small 
samples. The explanation could lie in the edutainment value. Nevertheless, if something 
helps, why not use it?  
One obstacle is that robots are very expensive, and at present are not autonomous 
enough to behave in the manner that the robots appeared to the children in the CRR 
studies. The robots were teleoperated by an unseen operator, and required a battery of 
hardware installed throughout the premises. A researcher had to be present in the 
classroom to safeguard the children and robots. To recommend investing in making these 
teaching aids both affordable and serviceable without considerable in-situ technical 
support requires robust evidence that robots have a positive impact on child outcomes, 
and that the effect can be attributed uniquely to the CRR; that is, that similar outcomes 
cannot be achieved by creating opportunities for peer tutoring, for instance. 
The question of what the CRR ‘does’ is not answerable merely through quantifiable 
outcomes. When putting a blanket on QRIO with a ‘night-night’ or teaching NAO correct 
  
English vocabulary, the child must build in mind two intentional states: self-as-caregiver 
and other-as-dependent; self-as-teacher and other-as-pupil. Young children commonly 
experience themselves in positions of dependence and ignorance. Opportunities for 
experiencing the other side of the power relation are crucial for personal, social and 
emotional development. Young children proactively make these opportunities in make-
believe.  
Children build a sense of their own personhood by entering shared contexts of 
experience, within which they acquire behavioral and attitudinal repertoires. They 
practice those repertoires in sociodramatic play. Suitably designed robots may serve a 
similar function as do traditional dolls, with whom the child could play roles such as 
parent, teacher, doctor, etc., with the artifact imaginatively positioned in complementary 
roles. Research by Kahn and associates (e.g. [9]) comparing preschoolers’ interactions 
with the robot dog AIBO and a stuffed toy dog has documented similar affectionate 
behavior towards both objects. Meaningful differences in the interaction patterns 
reflected children’s reactions to AIBO’s interactive capacity. A sophisticated robot 
companion might seem like a playmate rather than a plaything, but it would not become 
a significant other for the child unless the ‘voice’ of the robot (experienced as another 
person) becomes differentiated from others with whom the child regularly interacts.  
Looking forward to a technologized future in which this could happen, Ramey 
insists that it behooves on us to accept the artificial as having a self [22]. He frames this 
imperative as an unexpected ethical dilemma for social robotics: the field “needs to 
recognize that there is a reciprocal relationship of selves … that serves as the basis for 
all forms of social behavior and cognition in human beings” (p.137). Unlike ethical issues 
concerning the propriety of using robots—which can have solutions that entail tweaking 
the product or creating legislations to regulate its uses—the resolution of Ramey’s 
‘dilemma’ lies in changing our attitudes to robots. It begs the question, why aspire to 
create artificial persons in the first place? Turkle’s worry about the readiness to relinquish 
important relationships to robots, the so-called ‘robotic moment’ [23], may be recalled. 
Against the backdrop of those speculative arguments, the CRR idea transpires 
favorably as straightforward. Critical issues come to the fore when the CRR is considered 
in relation to child development. In various papers disseminating the RUBY project the 
principal investigators, Tanaka and Movellan, made strong claims based on impressions 
of toddler behavior. According to the abstract of [21] the results indicate that the 
technology is “surprisingly close to achieving autonomous bonding and socialization 
with human toddlers for sustained periods of time and that it could have great potential 
in educational settings assisting teachers and enriching the classroom environment.” 
However, as one psychologist put it, “To speak of ‘bonding’ in the sense of the Tanaka 
study—that the children liked the robots and had fun with them—is a choice of language 
that implies some connection with psychological research and theory but actually has 
none” ([24], p.236).  
Dialogue with child development may begin at a pragmatic level. Tanaka’s 
commonsense rationale has intuitive appeal, but the exposition of the concept could 
benefit from attention to the developmental trajectory. For instance, the finding in [20] 
that children learned just as well by observing the robot as by teaching it may cast doubts 
in the need for CRR; but the reported analysis did not distinguish between the age groups. 
Four-year-olds are developmentally quite different from 8-year-olds. Pretend play, such 
as caring for dolls, is typical of the preschool age group but less common in middle 
childhood. Younger children may benefit from a CRR in ways that cease to be relevant 
for older children.  
  
 
4. Epistemological Biases 
In engineering, the HRI field is distinctive in its emphasis on creating real systems and 
evaluating them by means of experiments with human subjects [25]. A proof-of-concept 
ethos nonetheless lingers in field trials. In the CRR studies, the concept ‘care-receiving 
robot’ was proven to work by the fact that children displayed caretaking behaviors. On 
its own, this confirmation does not constitute evidence for effects on child development. 
This and other biases reflect investigative and interpretative frameworks that are 
appropriate for what roboticists seek to know but are limited, if not misplaced, with 
respect to understanding the implications for child development.  
Subtle biases can enter studies that test hypotheses about CRI in ways that 
inadvertently prompt an exaggerated impression of the robot’s significance as a 
psychological ‘other’ for the child—a kind of ‘false positive’. In [26], 18-month-olds 
who had seen a robot interacting in a social-communicative manner with an adult were 
subsequently more likely to follow its gaze than did infants in other conditions (robot 
movement, passive adult; robot-adult mismatch; passive robot). The researchers 
underline the robot’s ‘social’ inclusion; yet the study demonstrates the necessity of a 
human agent as a source of social referencing for the infant. Hypothetically, if it were 
replicated with another human enacting the same scenarios as did the robot, infants might 
follow this person’s gaze in all experimental conditions.  
The ‘false positive’ is compounded with naïve assumption that similar behaviors 
must have the same psychological significance. For instance, investigators who 
measured the length of time that autistic children looked at NAO and at a teacher reported 
that the robot engaged the children in more ‘eye contact’ than did the teacher [27]. This 
construes CRI as an authentic interpersonal interaction although the robot might simply 
be an object of curiosity to the child. To make eye contact, the child must feel that the 
robot is looking back at him or her. We cannot tell whether it happens unless the child 
tells us (which could be difficult in the case of severely autistic children). 
The effectiveness of robots in education depends partly on whether they can sustain 
the child’s interest. Longitudinal studies repeatedly found that children grew bored with 
the robot after a few sessions [28, 29]. Roboticists typically tackle the problem by adding 
novel features to the robot so as to rekindle children’s interest. The observed glitch is 
converted into a technical challenge (how to change the robot so as to attract the child). 
Investigating the likelihood that children grow bored because they cannot see the point 
of having the robot around may lead to reframing the problem as the challenge of how 
to change the child’s perception and motivation. This begs the question of why should 
children be encouraged to be interested in robots in the first place.  
Another example: 8- and 12-year-olds who played a game alone, with a peer and 
with a robot (iCat) said they had more fun playing with the robot than alone, but not as 
much fun as playing with a friend [14]. The researchers recommend that more work 
should be done in order to achieve the same level of satisfaction when playing with robots 
as with peers. This again begs the question, why? Shouldn’t we encourage children to 
play with peers rather than robots? A child-centered standpoint would recommend more 
work on combatting issues such as social isolation and bullying—problems that do not 
have technological fixes. 
  
5. Conceptual Framework 
The above alludes to misalignment of investigative modes across disciplines. It is as if 
people look at the same object through different lenses. Since each lens is appropriate in 
its context, ‘one lens fits all’ is not a solution. Instead, a first step towards coherence is 
to identify constellations of processes, influences, interests and so forth, which form 
conditions for understanding CRI. Lenses through which CRI can be approached broadly 
constellate into four domains (Figure 1):  
 Technological research and development in robotics; 
 Processes of child development; 
 Normative expectancies about child development (cultural values, beliefs and 
childrearing practices); 
 Pragmatic, political and economic factors that influence research priorities. 
 
Figure 1. Domains impacting on the understanding of child-robot interaction (CRI). 
 
5.1. Processes of Child Development  
Ethical arguments often attend selectively to scientific knowledge. Pro-robot arguments 
tend to refer to cognitive learning [30, 31] whereas arguments against robots tend to draw 
upon theories of social-affective development [32, 33]. Developmental psychology 
emphasizes the ‘whole’ child even though psychologists may specialize in particular 
aspects of development. The core premise is threefold [34]:   
 A human being is a complex whole which is a part of a larger system.  
 Development means an increasing differentiation into subsystems and their 
organised integration.  
 Developmental differentiation and integration happens as the child 
participates with others in cultural practices. 
Bronfenbrenner describes human development as unfolding through proximal 
processes: progressively more complex reciprocal interactions between the individual 
child and the persons, objects, and symbolic resources constituting his/her immediate 
environment [35]. To have an impact on development, the interaction must be fairly 
regular over extended periods. Through engaging in routine activities and interactions, 
  
children learn to make sense of their world and to construct their own niche in it. 
Accordingly, robots may play a role in proximal processes when and if they enter the 
child’s world on a regular basis.  
Children’s everyday contact with robots is likely to occur within family and school 
settings already immersed in hi-tech lifestyles and reflecting the values and attitudes of 
tomorrow’s adults. A study of 3-year-olds’ interactions with present-day technologies at 
home found that parents’ previous experiences with technology and their beliefs about 
its educational potential were particularly significant towards how they made 
technologies available for their children [36]. Growing up with robots might change the 
proximal processes through changing familial and classroom relationships, and also 
change normative expectancies. 
5.2. Normative Expectancies 
Childrearing and educational practices are embedded within cultural structures. Domains 
of cross-cultural comparison include: collectivism/individualism; power distance 
between adult and child; children’s place in family and culture; and beliefs about how 
children learn [37]. In North America, the production and acceptance of child-focused 
robotics is driven by individualistic childrearing practices that are focused on cognitive 
stimulation and acceleration in the early years as well as increasing adaptation to 
interactions with technology [15]. In Japan, child-focused robotics is influenced by a 
different history and cultural attitudes to robots in conjunction with traditional 
collectivist childrearing practices that emphasize socialization [16].  
There is likely marketing potential for robot companions that facilitate remote 
monitoring of children. The risk is that busy parents might leave their infant child safe-
yet-alone with the robot for long periods of time [32]. Yet even if parents use the 
technology responsibly, these gadgets introduce new forms of surveillance and social 
control; and, in turn, may alter future generations’ beliefs about good parenting. 
Do we desire a society in which parent-child relationships are mediated by robots? 
The following may illustrate the query. A Japanese team developed a ‘sociable trash box’ 
(STB): a litterbin that runs after children urging them to pick up their litter [38]. It sounds 
like a good idea. Yet, getting children to comply with a robot is not quite the same as 
telling the child, “Do as I’m telling you.” Through the lens of robotics, a foreseeable 
drawback is that children might get bored and ignore the STB—glitches that invite design 
solutions. Through the lens of child development, the issue translates into the exigency 
of ascertaining the STB’s effectiveness in bringing about stable changes in child conduct. 
In contradistinction, the sociological lens of ‘expectancies’ directs attention to how the 
introduction of such gadgets might interact with adults’ powers to socialize children.  
 
5.3. Factors Affecting Research Priorities 
While the industry is keen to invest in widening applications for its products, robots are 
not yet commonplace enough for CRI to become a ‘burning issue’ in developmental 
psychology and therefore to persuade funding agencies to sponsor large-scale research 
initiatives into CRI. Politics of research funding as well as specific scholarly interests of 
those who are awarded research grants shape how CRI phenomena become constructed 
in actual research, and consequently what is known or understood about children and 
robots.  
  
6. Closing Reflection  
Discussing the concept of history, Walter Benjamin meditated upon a Klee painting 
(‘Angelus Novus’) showing an angel fixedly staring at us [39]. Benjamin imagines a 
storm blowing from Paradise and catching the angel with such violence that the angel 
cannot close his wings. “The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we 
call progress.” (p.393).  
In a way we are like this angel when seeking to understand what a future with robots 
might hold. The storm we call technological progress irresistibly propels us into a future 
we cannot see, while we stare at debris of old ontologies piling up. Pessimistically, 
seeking to establish whether robots will enhance or undermine child development might 
feel like rummaging in debris. Optimistically, there is scope for building a coherent 
framework that could accommodate divergent epistemologies. Problematizing their 
differences is a first step. 
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